如何从AccessViolationException检索注册上下文?

Pat*_*irk 5 c# c++ windbg crash-dumps

我有一个托管(C#)应用程序的x64故障转储,它可以调用本机代码.在本机代码尝试取消引用错误的内存位置之后,以及在.NET编组程序将其转换为内存之后,转储被执行AccessViolationException.因此,发生错误的堆栈帧不再可用,发生异常的线程现在被CLR异常处理程序劫持:

0:017> kb
 # RetAddr           : Args to Child                                                           : Call Site
00 000007fe`fd3b10dc : 00000000`0402958b 00000000`20000002 00000000`00000e54 00000000`00000e4c : ntdll!NtWaitForSingleObject+0xa
01 000007fe`ea9291eb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000cdc 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000cdc : KERNELBASE!WaitForSingleObjectEx+0x79
02 000007fe`ea929197 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : clr!CLREventWaitHelper2+0x38
03 000007fe`ea929120 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : clr!CLREventWaitHelper+0x1f
04 000007fe`ead8cae5 : 00000000`29cbc7c0 00000000`3213ce40 00000000`00000000 00000000`ffffffff : clr!CLREventBase::WaitEx+0x70
05 000007fe`ead8c9d0 : 00000000`29cbc7c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`0002b228 00000000`0002b228 : clr!Thread::WaitSuspendEventsHelper+0xf5
06 000007fe`eacf2145 : 00000000`007ea060 000007fe`ea924676 00000000`00000000 000007fe`fd3b18da : clr!Thread::WaitSuspendEvents+0x11
07 000007fe`eaccc00c : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : clr!Thread::RareEnablePreemptiveGC+0x33a905
08 000007fe`eae2c762 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`007cbce0 00000000`29cbc7c0 00000000`00000001 : clr!Thread::RareDisablePreemptiveGC+0x31b40c
09 000007fe`eaf662d4 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`007cbce0 00000000`29cbc7c0 00000000`00000000 : clr!EEDbgInterfaceImpl::DisablePreemptiveGC+0x22
0a 000007fe`eaf66103 : 00000000`29cb0100 00000000`00000000 00000000`3213cf80 00000000`29cbca20 : clr!Debugger::SendExceptionHelperAndBlock+0x174
0b 000007fe`eaf65d0d : ffffffff`ffffffff 00000000`29cbca20 00000000`29cbc700 000007fe`eaf62100 : clr!Debugger::SendExceptionEventsWorker+0x343
0c 000007fe`eaf61bd8 : 00000000`00000100 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000019 00000000`3213dd01 : clr!Debugger::SendException+0x15d
0d 000007fe`eadac75d : 00000000`007cbce0 00000000`3213d258 00000000`3213d1e8 00000000`00000001 : clr!Debugger::LastChanceManagedException+0x1f8
0e 000007fe`eaf698c7 : 000075ce`2b30e018 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : clr!NotifyDebuggerLastChance+0x6d
0f 000007fe`eaf6af20 : 00000000`00000000 000007fe`8cf40020 000007fe`8cfa200c 4328fffe`43e0fffe : clr!Debugger::UnhandledHijackWorker+0x1a7
10 000007fe`eaaacbf0 : 00000000`0000000a 00000000`2ab23e30 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : clr!ExceptionHijackWorker+0xc0
11 00000000`3213d8c0 : 00000000`3213ddb0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`0000000b : clr!ExceptionHijack+0x30
12 00000000`3213ddb0 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`0000000b 00000000`0035578c : 0x3213d8c0
13 00000000`00000001 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`0000000b 00000000`0035578c ffffffff`00000002 : 0x3213ddb0
14 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`0000000b 00000000`0035578c ffffffff`00000002 00000000`00350268 : 0x1
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并且.exr -1(显示最近的异常)返回:

0:017> .exr -1
ExceptionAddress: 00000000771d685a (user32!ZwUserMessageCall+0x000000000000000a)
   ExceptionCode: 80000004 (Single step exception)
  ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 0
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调用user32!ZwUserMessageCall是在线程0的堆栈顶部,而不是发生本机异常的17,所以我只能假设它没有指向我的异常.

我可以转储访问冲突异常以获取有关本机错误的一些信息:

0:017> !DumpObj /d 0000000012175640
Name:        System.AccessViolationException
MethodTable: 000007fee9a61fe8
EEClass:     000007fee9528300
Size:        176(0xb0) bytes
File:        C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_64\mscorlib\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\mscorlib.dll
Fields:
              MT    Field   Offset                 Type VT     Attr            Value Name
000007fee9a50e08  4000002        8        System.String  0 instance 000000001217b538 _className
000007fee9a5b218  4000003       10 ...ection.MethodBase  0 instance 0000000000000000 _exceptionMethod
000007fee9a50e08  4000004       18        System.String  0 instance 0000000000000000 _exceptionMethodString
000007fee9a50e08  4000005       20        System.String  0 instance 0000000012179818 _message
000007fee9a61f18  4000006       28 ...tions.IDictionary  0 instance 0000000000000000 _data
000007fee9a51038  4000007       30     System.Exception  0 instance 0000000000000000 _innerException
000007fee9a50e08  4000008       38        System.String  0 instance 0000000000000000 _helpURL
000007fee9a513e8  4000009       40        System.Object  0 instance 0000000012179ad0 _stackTrace
000007fee9a513e8  400000a       48        System.Object  0 instance 0000000012179c68 _watsonBuckets
000007fee9a50e08  400000b       50        System.String  0 instance 0000000000000000 _stackTraceString
000007fee9a50e08  400000c       58        System.String  0 instance 0000000000000000 _remoteStackTraceString
000007fee9a53980  400000d       88         System.Int32  1 instance                0 _remoteStackIndex
000007fee9a513e8  400000e       60        System.Object  0 instance 0000000000000000 _dynamicMethods
000007fee9a53980  400000f       8c         System.Int32  1 instance      -2147467261 _HResult
000007fee9a50e08  4000010       68        System.String  0 instance 0000000000000000 _source
000007fee9a54a00  4000011       78        System.IntPtr  1 instance                0 _xptrs
000007fee9a53980  4000012       90         System.Int32  1 instance       -532462766 _xcode
000007fee9a02d50  4000013       80       System.UIntPtr  1 instance                0 _ipForWatsonBuckets
000007fee9a3d210  4000014       70 ...ializationManager  0 instance 0000000012179900 _safeSerializationManager
000007fee9a513e8  4000001        0        System.Object  0   shared           static s_EDILock
                                 >> Domain:Value  00000000007e09b0:NotInit  <<
000007fee9a54a00  400018a       98        System.IntPtr  1 instance      7fedad179f4 _ip
000007fee9a54a00  400018b       a0        System.IntPtr  1 instance fffffffc2ab22078 _target
000007fee9a53980  400018c       94         System.Int32  1 instance                0 _accessType
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从这里我看到失败的指令地址(7fedad179f4)和代码试图取消引用的地址(fffffffc2ab22078).它似乎是某种方式的符号扩展或溢出错误,但在代码中可能发生的情况并不明显.引用的指令是:

0:017> u 7fedad179f4
MYDLL!_interpolate+0x174 [c:\my\source\file.c @ 85]:
000007fe`dad179f4 f3450f59548404  mulss   xmm10,dword ptr [r12+rax*4+4]
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为了进一步调试这一点,我需要当本地代码崩溃,看看有什么是寄存器上下文r12rax.这有可能找回来吗?


编辑: 我试图获取有关参数的信息ExceptionHijackWorker,但这些值对我没有意义.根据@ ST的链接的功能签名是

void STDCALL ExceptionHijackWorker(T_CONTEXT * pContext,
                                   EXCEPTION_RECORD * pRecord,
                                   EHijackReason::EHijackReason reason,
                                   void * pData);
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所以第一个参数0000000a作为指针是没有意义的.并且转储第二个参数会000000002ab23e30产生以下的无意义数据EXCEPTION_RECORD:

0:017> dd 000000002ab23e30
00000000`2ab23e30  00000019 00000019 2ab23e40 00000000
00000000`2ab23e40  42b8f800 42b8de00 42b89b00 42b85000
00000000`2ab23e50  42b81b00 42b7a000 42b72600 42b6fa00
00000000`2ab23e60  42b6a000 42b67a00 42b63600 42b59c00
00000000`2ab23e70  42b4fc00 42b4da00 42b49e00 42b46a00
00000000`2ab23e80  42b38e00 42b31c00 42b2d600 42b29000
00000000`2ab23e90  42b2ec00 42b2fa00 42b2a000 42b27a00
00000000`2ab23ea0  42b23e00 42b6e800 42b6ab00 42b66c80
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0x190x19对于ExceptionCodeExceptionFlags没有意义; 没有具有该值的代码,并且该标志被记录为零或EXCEPTION_NONCONTINUABLE,其被定义为1.

我在这里误解了什么吗?

Pat*_*irk 3

遵循@ST的建议的建议,我开始探索调用堆栈,看看是否可以找到异常记录或上下文记录。我从堆栈底部的奇怪之处开始,即:

0:017> k
 # Child-SP          RetAddr           Call Site
...
0f 00000000`3213d210 000007fe`eaf6af20 clr!Debugger::UnhandledHijackWorker+0x1a7
10 00000000`3213d850 000007fe`eaaacbf0 clr!ExceptionHijackWorker+0xc0
11 00000000`3213d880 00000000`3213d8c0 clr!ExceptionHijack+0x30
12 00000000`3213d8a8 00000000`3213ddb0 0x3213d8c0
13 00000000`3213d8b0 00000000`00000001 0x3213ddb0
14 00000000`3213d8b8 00000000`00000000 0x1
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偶然发现异常记录:

0:017> .exr 00000000`3213ddb0 
ExceptionAddress: 000007fedad179f4 (SMTCV!_interpolate+0x0000000000000174)
   ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
  ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
   Parameter[0]: 0000000000000000
   Parameter[1]: fffffffc2ab22078
Attempt to read from address fffffffc2ab22078
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然后我碰巧找到了上下文记录(我正在寻找的内容):

0:017> .cxr 00000000`3213d8c0 
rax=0000000000000019 rbx=000000000000000a rcx=00000000709c7c88
rdx=0000000000000002 rsi=000000002ab23e30 rdi=0000000080000000
rip=000007fedad179f4 rsp=000000003213dff0 rbp=0000000000000019
 r8=000007ffffe22000  r9=0000000070910000 r10=0000000000000000
r11=000000003213e0a0 r12=fffffffc2ab22010 r13=000000002b50ae40
r14=000000002ab241ec r15=0000000000000003
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=0000  es=0000  fs=0000  gs=0000             efl=00010200
MYDLL!_interpolate+0x174:
000007fe`dad179f4 f3450f59548404  mulss   xmm10,dword ptr [r12+rax*4+4] ds:fffffffc`2ab22078=????????
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我可以看到我的坏指针r12

我不明白这些堆栈帧是什么,也不明白为什么异常和上下文记录被存储为它们的返回地址。对于我和未来的读者来说,任何对此的评论都会很棒。